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accidental bequest. Even if all consumers have the same ex ante mortality probabilities, there will be some
intracohort variation in the date of death; consequently there will be a nondegenerate distribution of bequests
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variation in the distributions of wealth, consumption, and bequests of subsequent generations.
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 Precautionary Saving and Accidental Bequests
 By ANDREW B. ABEL*
 This paper presents a simple general equi-
 librium model of precautionary saving and
 accidental bequests. This model is used to
 analyze the implications of individual life-
 time uncertainty for aggregate consumption
 and capital accumulation. A precautionary
 demand for saving arises because an individ-
 ual consumer does not know in advance the
 date at which he will die, and he wants to
 avoid low levels of consumption in the event
 that he lives longer than expected. An impli-
 cation of this precautionary saving is that
 when death does occur, the consumer is gen-
 erally holding some wealth, which is then
 passed on to his heirs in the form of an
 accidental bequest. Even if all consumers
 have the same ex ante mortality probabili-
 ties, there will be some intracohort variation
 in the date of death; consequently there will
 be a nondegenerate distribution of bequests
 left by consumers in a cohort. This nondegen-
 erate distribution of bequests left by one
 generation induces variation in the distribu-
 tions of wealth, consumption, and bequests
 of subsequent generations.
 The importance of bequests in aggregate
 saving has been established by Laurence
 Kotlikoff and Lawrence Summers (1981) who
 reported that 80 percent of U.S. household
 wealth is inherited wealth. One interpreta-
 tion of this finding is that the simple life
 cycle model without bequest motives is an
 inadequate description of saving behavior in
 the United States, but the model I present
 demonstrates that accidental bequests by
 selfish consumers can account for a poten-
 tially sizeable fraction of aggregate wealth.
 Although some part of bequests, especially
 by the wealthy, undoubtedly results from an
 explicit bequest motive, accidental bequests
 also play a role in the intergenerational
 transfer of wealth as well as in the intra-
 generational variation in wealth. In order to
 focus on the role of accidental bequests, I
 purposely exclude a bequest motive from the
 specification of the utility function.'
 The effects of lifetime uncertainty on indi-
 vidual consumption behavior were first ex-
 amined formally in a seminal paper by
 Menachem Yaari (1965). Yaari's model pro-
 vided the basic framework for virtually all
 subsequent work on uncertain lifetimes in-
 cluding well-known papers by Nils Hakans-
 son (1969), Stanley Fischer (1973), Robert
 Barro and James Friedman (1977), David
 Levhari and Leonard Mirman (1977), and
 Kotlikoff and Avia Spivak (1981). However,
 all of these papers focused on the consump-
 tion decision of an individual and ignored
 the effect of accidental bequests on the be-
 havior of the recipients of these accidental
 bequests.2 As will be shown at various points
 in this paper, changes in the economic en-
 vironment can have effects on aggregate be-
 havior which differ sharply from the effects
 on individual behavior because of the endog-
 enous adjustment of bequests. The effects of
 *Department of Economics, Harvard University,
 Cambridge, MA 02138. This paper is a revised version
 of "Bequests and Social Security with Uncertain Life-
 times," NBER Working Paper No. 1372, June 1984. I
 thank Olivier Blanchard, John Burbidge, Christopher
 Cavanagh, Robert Clower, Stanley Fischer, Benjamin
 Friedman, Elhanan Helpman, Mervyn King, Nobuhiro
 Kiyotaki, Laurence Kotlikoff, Robert McDonald, James
 Pesando, Julio Rotemberg, Lawrence Summers, Lars
 Svensson, Mark Watson, and Jeffrey Wolcowitz for val-
 uable conversations and correspondence. I also thank
 the participants in seminars at Boston University, Col-
 umbia University, Cornell University, Federal Reserve
 Board, Harvard University, University of Iowa, MIT,
 University of Minnesota, University of Montreal, Na-
 tional Bureau of Economic Research, North Carolina
 State University, the Wharton School, and Yale Univer-
 sity, and two anonymous referees for their helpful com-
 ments. I also thank the National Science Foundation for
 financial support.
 1 In the presence of perfect annuity and life insurance
 markets, there may or may not be bequests (depending
 on the presence or absence of a bequest motive), but
 there would be no accidental bequests.
 2 Kotlikoff and Spivak focus on the role of the family
 in providing an (incomplete) annuities market, but stop
 short of a full-scale overlapping generations model in
 which the distribution of bequests is determined endoge-
 nously.
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 the endogenous adjustment of bequests are
 modeled by embedding consumers with un-
 certain lifetimes into an overlapping-genera-
 tions model a la Franco Modigliani and
 Richard Brumberg (1979), Paul Samuelson
 (1958), and Peter Diamond (1965). The model
 is dramatically different from the overlap-
 ping generations model with uncertain life-
 times proposed by Eytan Sheshinski and
 Yoram Weiss (1981), because Sheshinski-
 Weiss assume that all consumers who are
 born at the same date also die on the same
 date. Thus, unlike the model presented be-
 low, the Sheshinski-Weiss model does not
 generate intracohort variation in bequests,
 consumption, and wealth.
 Zvi Eckstein, Martin Eichenbaum, and
 Dan Peled (1985a) have developed an over-
 lapping generations model in which con-
 sumers have identical ex ante mortality
 probabilities but die at different ages. Since
 the Eckstein et al. model, which was devel-
 oped independently of my model presented
 below, is similar to that model, it is worth
 commenting on the differences between the
 two models. First, and most importantly, the
 Eckstein et al. model has no capital although
 one could interpret that model as applying to
 an economy in which the net rate of return
 on capital is zero (i.e., a costless storage
 technology). However, as shown below, the
 effects of Social Security policy differ de-
 pending on whether or not the rate of return
 on capital is zero. Second, in my model, the
 instantaneous utility function is assumed to
 display hyperbolic absolute risk aversion
 (HARA), whereas Eckstein et al. use a more
 general concave utility function. However,
 their formulation is not as general as it might
 first appear because Eckstein et al. must at
 some point assume that the concavity of the
 derived saving function is "not too large"
 without presenting the implied restrictions
 on the utility function. An advantage of the
 HARA utility function used here is that it
 leads to linear decision rules, thereby making
 the analysis easily tractable. Third, my mod-
 el presented below allows for nonzero rates
 of time preference and population growth,
 whereas each of these rates is assumed to be
 zero by Eckstein et al.
 In Section I, I present a simple model of
 individual consumption behavior in the pres-
 ence of an uncertain lifetime. In Section II,
 I trace the effects of accidental bequests on
 the saving and consumption of subsequent
 generations and calculate the steady-state
 intracohort distributions of consumption,
 wealth, and bequests. The next three sections
 analyze the aggregate and distributional con-
 sequences of introducing different types of
 annuities into the economy. Section III dem-
 onstrates that, in the absence of an annuity
 market, the introduction of a fully funded
 actuarially fair Social Security system leads
 to a reduction in the steady-state national
 capital stock. In addition, the introduction of
 actuarially fair Social Security reduces all
 central moments of the distributions of con-
 sumption, wealth, and bequests. Section IV
 is devoted to an analysis of the transition
 path to the new steady state. In Section V, I
 show that the introduction of a competitive
 annuity market can cause the steady-state
 capital stock either to rise or fall depending
 on whether the coefficient of relative risk
 aversion is less than or greater than a certain
 critical value. Concluding remarks and direc-
 tions for further research are presented in
 Section VI.
 I. Individual Consumption Behavior
 under Uncertain Lifetime
 Consider an economy with many con-
 sumers and a single commodity. This com-
 modity can be either consumed or invested.
 If one unit of the commodity is invested, it
 yields R units of the commodity in the fol-
 lowing period. Each consumer lives either
 one or two periods. A consumer works dur-
 ing the first period of his (or her) life earning
 a fixed labor income Y.3 Also in the first
 period of his life, a consumer consumes an
 amount cl and pays a tax T. At the end of
 the first period of his life, the consumer has
 G ?1 children. There is a probability p that
 the consumer dies at the end of his first
 3It is assumed that the production function is linear
 in capital and employment. Let N, be the number of
 consumers born at the beginning of period t and let
 K,-1 be the average capital stock held at the end of
 period t-1 by consumers born at the beginning of
 period t -1. Then aggregate output in period t is N, Y +
 RN, -IK,-1.
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 period of life4 (after having the children). If
 the consumer survives to the second period
 of life, he does not work but receives a Social
 Security payment S. He then consumes an
 amount c2. When a consumer dies (either at
 the end of period one or period two), any
 unconsumed wealth is divided equally among
 his children.
 Each consumer chooses c1 and c2 to maxi-
 mize the following utility function
 (1) U(CO + (1-P) U(CA
 where 0 < 8 < 1. This utility function is based
 on the uncertain lifetime literature in which
 the discounted utility index for period j is
 multiplied by the probability of being alive
 in period j. This formulation is simply the
 expected value of a state-contingent utility
 function in which U(cj) is the utility index
 contingent on being alive at age j, and the
 utility index is identically zero contingent on
 not being alive at age j.5 According to the
 utility function in (1), consumers do not care
 about their children; they derive no utility
 from leaving bequests.6
 Up to this point it may appear that all
 consumers are identical: they have identical
 utility functions, labor income Y, taxes T,
 childbearing characteristics, probabilities of
 survival, and, if they survive, identical Social
 Security benefits S. However, different con-
 sumers receive bequests of different sizes de-
 pending on the mortality history of the earlier
 generations of their families. Let B be the
 bequest a consumer receives from his parent
 when he is born.7 For the moment, take B as
 given; the determination of B will be dis-
 cussed in Section II.
 Finally, W is defined to be the wealth held
 by a consumer at the end of the first period
 of his life:
 (2) W= B + Y-T-cl.
 If a consumer dies at the end of his first
 period of life, each of his children receives
 R W/G as a bequest at the beginning of the
 following period. If the consumer survives
 into the second period, he consumes C2=
 R W + S, because he derives no utility from
 leaving a bequest. Using equation (2), we
 have
 (3) C2 =R [ B + Y-T-cl ] + S.
 The consumer's first-period consumption
 is determined by maximizing (1) with respect
 to cl, subject to the constraint in (3), to
 obtain
 (4) U'(cl) = (1-p) RSU'(C2)-
 The first-order condition in (4) equates the
 marginal utility of a unit of first-period con-
 sumption with the expected present value of
 the utility from the R units of second-period
 consumption which could be obtained by
 reducing current consumption by one unit. I
 specify the utility index U(c) to be a member
 of the HARA (hyperbolic absolute risk aver-
 sion) family8
 (5) U(c) - uy t-h y o l
 With HARA utility, the optimal value of
 4Although individual consumers face uncertainty
 about their date of death, there is no aggregate uncer-
 tainty; a fraction p of consumers in each generation
 dies at the end of the first period of life.
 51t is not necessary that the utility index is equal to
 zero in the case of death. All that is required is that
 utility in the state of death does not depend on the level
 of wealth.
 6 Fischer and Sheshinski-Weiss model consumers as
 deriving utility from leaving a bequest. This utility is a
 function of the size of the bequest. Barro (1974) and
 Allan Drazen (1978), in models without lifetime uncer-
 tainty, assume that consumers derive utility from the
 utility of their children. Douglas Bernheim, Andrei
 Shleifer, and Summers (1984) argue that parents use the
 prospect of bequests as a way to induce their children to
 behave in ways that the parent wants. Thus, although
 parents care only about their own utility, they find it
 optimal to leave bequests.
 7If a parent dies after the first period of his life, his
 child receives a bequest B at the beginning of the first
 period of the child's life. If a parent lives two periods,
 then as shown below, the child receives no bequest in
 either period; in this case, of course, the bequest re-
 ceived at birth by the child is zero.
 The utility function in (5) is subject to the following
 restrictions: y 1; B > O; (,Bc/(1- y))+ ij > 0; i = 1 if
 -y = - oc. The HA RA family of utility functions includes
 the following special cases: (i) constant relative risk
 aversion (,j = 0), which includes logarithmic utility if
 y = 0; (ii) constant absolute risk aversion (-y = + oc);
 and (iii) quadratic utility (y = 2).
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 first-period consumption can be written as a
 linear function of the present value of life-
 time income B + Y-T + R -s,
 (6a) cl=a(B+Y-T+R-'S)+b,
 where
 (6b) 0<a
 = [I1+ R-'[(I -p) RS] </( I) <
 (6c) b = ((I1--y) rql,8) aR-
 x |1-((1-p )R8 )11(1 7Y)]
 Note that a, the marginal propensity to con-
 sume, is a positive constant less than one.
 If U(c) has constant relative risk aversion
 = 0), then b = 0 and first-period con-
 sumption is proportional to the present value
 of disposable lifetime resources B + Y - T +
 R - 'S. Let a 1- -y be the (constant) coeffi-
 cient of relative risk aversion and note that if
 R = 8 = 1 (i.e., zero time preference and zero
 net rate of return on capital), then the frac-
 tion of total disposable resources (B + Y - T
 + S) consumed in the first period of life is
 a = [1 + (1 - p)/I]-l. The greater the coeffi-
 cient of relative risk aversion, the smaller the
 fraction of disposable resources consumed in
 the first period. In the limit as a -x o, a
 consumer would consume one-half of dis-
 posable resources in the first period; with a
 large a, the desire to smooth consumption is
 so strong that the consumer is willing to save
 one-half of his resources in order to provide
 for second-period consumption equal to
 first-period consumption even though he
 might die before the second period. On the
 other hand, in the limit as a -- 0, the desire
 to smooth consumption is very weak so the
 consumer would consume all of his dispos-
 able resources in the first period.9
 Using the consumption function (6), we
 can easily calculate the end-of-first-period
 wealth and the second-period consumption
 of the consumer. Combining equations (2)
 and (6) yields
 (7) W= (1-a)(B+Y-T)-aR-'S-b.
 Combining equations (3) and (6) yields the
 income expansion path
 (8) C2= [(1-a)cl-b] R/a,
 which is linear and positively sloped.
 II. Intergenerational Transfers
 I have solved the consumer's saving-con-
 sumption decision conditional on the be-
 quest B received at birth. In this section, I
 calculate the bequests received by each con-
 sumer. The bequest received by a consumer
 depends on the mortality history of the earlier
 generations of his family. Specifically, let j
 be the number of consecutive previous gener-
 ations in a consumer's family that died at
 age 1 (i.e., did not live to the second period
 of their life). For example, j = 0 indicates
 that the consumer's parent lived two periods
 and therefore left no bequest to the con-
 sumer. If j =1, then the consumer's parent
 died at age I leaving a bequest but the
 consumer's grandparent lived two periods
 leaving no bequest. All consumers are in-
 dexed according to j and I use the super-
 script j written in parentheses to indicate
 that a variable pertains to a consumer of
 type j. Observe that p'(l - p) is the fraction
 of consumers who are of type j.
 First consider type-0 consumers. As indi-
 cated above, the parents of these consumers
 lived two periods, leaving no bequest so that
 B(-)= 0. The first-period consumption and
 end-of-first-period wealth of these consumers
 follow immediately from (6) and (7), respec-
 tively: 10
 (9) c?) = a(Y -T+ R-1S)+ b,
 (9 __)As/_\ 1_
 9If the consumer cannot borrow against his (uncer-
 tain) future Social Security benefit S, then cl - B + Y -
 T as a - 0. Of course, if S = 0, then the consumer will
 indeed consume all of his disposable lifetime resources
 in the first period.
 10I assume that S and T are small enough and that
 the utility function and labor income are such that
 W(?) > 0. Note that if b = 0 (as it would be with con-
 stant relative risk aversion), then W(?) > 0 provided that
 S and T are small enough.
This content downloaded from 130.91.116.186 on Fri, 14 Jul 2017 16:48:27 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms
 VOL. 75 NO. 4 A BEL: PRECA UTIONARY SA VING A ND ACCIDENTAL BEQUESTS 781
 Now consider consumers who receive posi-
 tive bequests at birth, that is, consumers of
 type j, j ?1. Because all consumers have the
 same constant marginal propensity to con-
 sume, the difference in first-period consump-
 tion between any two consumers is propor-
 tional to the difference in the bequests they
 received at birth. In particular, the first-
 period consumption of a type-j consumer
 exceeds the first-period consumption of a
 type-0 consumer by aBO'):
 (11) CO) = aB(i) + c(?)
 Similarly, intracohort differences in end-of-
 first-period wealth are proportional to in-
 tracohort differences in the bequest received
 at birth, so that from (7) and (10) we obtain
 (12) W(j) = (I1-a) BOj + W(?).
 Having related first-period consumption
 and end-of-first-period wealth to BO), the
 bequest received at birth, the next step is to
 calculate B 0). If a type-j -1 consumer dies
 after one period, he leaves a bequest of
 G-'W(j-') to each of his children (who are
 type-j consumers). The bequest earns a gross
 rate of return R so that
 (13) B(i)= (R/G)W('-1) =1,2,3....
 Substituting (13) into (12) yields the first-
 order linear constant coefficient difference
 equation W(i) = (1 - a)(R/G)WO-') +
 W( =1, 2,3,..., which has the solution
 (14) W(-) = W() (1-a)'(R /G)'
 i=O
 j = 0,1,2,....
 According to (14), as we increase the
 number of previous generations that died
 early leaving bequests, we increase W( j).
 We will assume that (1- a)R < G; hence,
 as j increases, WO') approaches W(?)/
 [1 -(1- a)(R/G)] asymptotically."1
 I have now obtained a complete formal
 solution of the model. Given any nonnega-
 tive integer j, we know that a fraction (1-
 p)pJ of the population is of type j. Then,
 using equations (9)-(11), (13), and (14), it is
 a simple matter to calculate the consump-
 tion, wealth, and bequests received at birth
 by each type-j consumer. The next step is to
 summarize the distributions of consumption,
 wealth and bequests by calculating the values
 of aggregate first-period consumption C1*,
 aggregate second-period consumption C2*,
 aggregate private wealth W*, and aggregate
 bequests B*. Each of these aggregates is
 expressed on a per capita basis (more pre-
 cisely, per person in the young generation).'2
 Calculating the aggregate per capita values
 of both sides of (12), we obtain
 (15) W* = (1-a)B* + W(O).
 Because a fraction p of each type of con-
 sumer dies early leaving a bequest, aggregate
 wealth held by consumers who die young is
 pW*. Including the accrued interest on this
 wealth and adjusting for the fact that each
 generation has G times as many consumers
 as the previous generation, we obtain
 (16) B* = p(R/G)W*.
 Substituting (16) into (15) yields
 (17) W*=W(O)/(1-(1-a)pR/G).
 Therefore, per capita wealth is proportional
 to W(0), the wealth of type-O consumers, and
 the constant of proportionality is indepen-
 dent of the tax parameters T and S.
 1'Since 0 < a < 1, it follows immediately that if R <
 G, then the convergence condition (1 - a) R < G holds.
 To examine the case where R > G, observe from (6b)
 that (1- a) R =,fRll(l-Y)/[l + fRYl(l-Y)], where -=
 [(1 - p)8]l/(l Therefore, (1- a)R < G if and only
 if OR"'1'- Y)[1-G/R] < G. If R > G, then the con-
 vergence condition holds if and only if p < [G/
 (R -G)]R -/(1 - e)
 12For example, aggregate private wealth per capita is
 defined as W* = Y3?o(1 p)p' W('). Since only a frac-
 tion (1- p) of young consumers survives to the second
 period of life, and since each generation is only G-'
 times as large as the succeeding generation, aggregate
 second-period consumption is
 C2 - (1- p)G- 1 (1- p)pk Ci.
 I 0)
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 Aggregate economywide private consump-
 tion per capita, C{* + C2*, is equal to the sum
 of after-tax labor income, Y - T, plus Social
 Security payments to the surviving fraction
 (1 - p) of the old cohort, plus the net return
 on wealth, adjusted for population growth,'3
 (18) C1*+C2*=Y-T+(1-p)G-'S
 + ( RI G-1) W* .
 A final useful relation between C* and C2*
 is obtained by calculating the per capita val-
 ues of both sides of the income expansion
 path in (8) and recalling that the old cohort
 has (1 - p)G ' times as many consumers as
 the young cohort,
 (19) C2*=(1-p)G -[(1-a)C,*-b] R/a.
 Thus, C1* and C2* move in the same direc-
 tion in response to changes in labor income
 Y, or in the Social Security parameters S
 and T.
 III. The Effects of Actuarially Fair
 Social Security
 In this section I consider the effects on
 savings and consumption of the introduction
 of a fully funded actuarially fair Social
 Security system. Let us suppose that the only
 role of the government is to collect Social
 Security taxes from the young and distribute
 Social Security benefits to the old. Thus the
 taxes T levied on the young are Social Secur-
 ity taxes. An actuarially fair Social Security
 system would levy a tax of (1 - p) R - l dol-
 lars for each dollar of expected benefits, that
 is, RT=(1-p)S. Under this system, a
 young consumer contributes (1-p )R - 'S to
 the Social Security system. He receives S if
 he survives to the second period of life, but
 receives zero if he dies after one period. Thus
 the expected present value of the Social
 Security benefit is (1 - p) R - 'S which is equal
 to the consumer's contribution. Put differ-
 ently, the Social Security system runs a bal-
 anced account vis-'a-vis each generation. The
 Social Security system collects taxes from the
 members of each generation when they are
 young, invests the tax revenue at a gross rate
 of return R, and then returns all of the tax
 revenue with accrued interest to the surviv-
 ing old members of the generation.
 A. Aggregate Consumption and
 Capital Accumulation
 In order to study the effects of actuarially
 fair Social Security on aggregate consump-
 tion, I proceed in three steps. First, I analyze
 the effects of Social Security on the saving
 and consumption behavior of type-0 con-
 sumers. Then, I use the results about the
 effects on W(?) to analyze the effects on the
 private capital stock and on the total na-
 tional capital stock. Finally, the relations
 between the national capital stock and ag-
 gregate consumption are used to determine
 the effects on Cl* and C2*.
 To calculate the effects of actuarially fair
 social security on consumption and saving of
 young type-0 consumers, we substitute T=
 (1- p)R 'S into (9) and (10) to obtain
 (20) c(?)= aY+b+apR-'S,
 (21) W(0)=(1-a)Y-b-T-apR-'S.
 The introduction of actuarially fair Social
 Security increases the present value of life-
 time resources, B + Y-T + R -1S, by -T +
 R l'S = pR - 'S. A consumer who survives to
 the second period receives a Social Security
 payment S that exceeds the value of his
 contribution with accrued interest, RT, be-
 cause the surviving members of each genera-
 tion receive (on a pro rata basis) the taxes-
 cum-interest contributed by members of their
 generation who died after one period. The
 effect of this increase in lifetime resources is
 to increase c(?) by apR - 1S.14 The wealth
 '3Observe from (2) and (16) that C * = B* + Y- T-
 W* =Y-T-(1-pR/G)W*. Since c(i)= RW(j)+S,
 and since the old cohort is (1 - p)CG- times as large as
 the young cohort, we obtain C2* = (1 - p) G - l ( R W* +
 S). Adding together the expressions for C1* and C2*
 yields (18).
 14An alternative explanation for the increase in con-
 sumption is that a consumer's claim to Social Security
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 held at the end of the first period by type-O
 consumers is reduced for two reasons: first,
 disposable resources available in the first
 period fall by the amount of the tax T;
 second, the increase in first-period consump-
 tion further reduces wealth held at the end of
 the first period."5
 In a fully funded Social Security system,
 the total national capital stock per capita
 (measured at the end of a period) is equal to
 the sum of the aggregate private capital stock
 per capita, W*, and the per capita capital
 stock held by the Social Security system T.
 Recall from (17), that the private capital
 stock W* is proportional to W", and that
 the constant of proportionality does not de-
 pend on the parameters of the Social Secur-
 ity system. Since, from (21), the introduction
 of Social Security reduces W(?), it also re-
 duces the aggregate private capital stock.
 Since B* = ( pR/G)W*, the reduction in the
 aggregate private capital stock implies an
 equiproportionate reduction in aggregate be-
 quests per capita.
 The effect of actuarially fair Social Secur-
 ity on the aggregate national capital stock
 per capita, W* + T, is easily determined by
 first observing from the definition of end-of-
 first-period wealth in (2) that
 (22) W* + T = Y+ B*-C1*I.
 Then calculating the aggregate per capita
 values of both sides of (11) we obtain
 (23) C* = aB* + c(O)
 Substituting (23) into (22) yields
 (24) W*+T=Y+(1-a)B*-c(o).
 Since he introduction of Social Security
 causes B* to fall and c(?) to increase, it is
 clear from (24) that the aggregate national
 capital stock W* + T is reduced by the intro-
 duction of Social Security.
 Next I examine the effects on aggregate
 consumption of the introduction of actu-
 arially fair Social Security. Substituting RT
 for (1 - p)S in (18) gives
 (25) C* + C2* = Y+ ((R/G)-1)(W* + T).
 Thus, aggregate private consumption is equal
 to the sum of labor income Y and the net
 return (adjusted for population growth) on
 national wealth. Observe that if R = G, so
 that the net rate of return on capital is equal
 to the rate of population growth, then the
 coefficient on national wealth in (25) is zero.
 In this case, C* + C2* is independent of the
 level of actuarially fair Social Security taxes
 and benefits. Furthermore, in view of the
 aggregate income expansion path in (19),
 both C* and C2* are independent of the
 level of actuarially fair Social Security taxes
 and benefits when R = G. If R > G, then the
 reduction in aggregate wealth, W* + T, in-
 duced by the introduction of Social Security,
 leads to a reduction in C* + C2*; in light of
 (19), C1* and C2* are each reduced by the
 introduction of actuarially fair Social Secur-
 ity. Finally, if R < G, then C1* and C2* are
 each increased by the introduction of actu-
 arially fair Social Security."6
 benefits can be viewed as an annuity. If the consumer
 survives until retirement, the annuity pays some specified
 amount, but if the consumer dies before retirement, the
 annuity pays zero. Under an actuarially fair Social
 Security system, the price that the consumer pays for
 this annuity (i.e., the Social Security tax levied on young
 consumers) is equal to the expected present value of
 future payoffs. However, consumers would be willing to
 pay more than the expected present value of future
 payoffs because the payoffs are positively correlated
 with future marginal utility of consumption. The annu-
 ity has a positive payoff if and only if the consumer
 survives, thereby having a positive marginal utility of
 consumption; the annuity has a zero payoff if the con-
 sumer dies, in which case wealth has zero marginal
 utility. Therefore, an actuarially fair increase in the level
 of Social Security taxes and benefits will make a young
 consumer wealthier and hence increase his consumption.
 '5In a balanced budget pay-as-you-go system, GT=
 (1 - p)S. In this case, equation (9) implies c(?) = aY+ b
 + a((G/((1 - p)R))-1)T so that the introduction of
 Social Security causes c(?) to increase, decrease, or
 remain unchanged according to whether G is greater
 than, less than, or equal to (1- p) R. It follows from
 equation (10) that the introduction of Social Security
 causes W(?) to fall by (1- a)T+ aR-S.
 16 Under a balanced budget pay-as-you-go system,
 GT = (1 -p ) S, so that from (18) aggregate consump-
 tion is C * + C2* = Y+(R/G-1)W*. As shown in fn.
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 B. The Intracohort Distributions of
 Consumption and Wealth
 Having analyzed the effects of Social
 Security on the aggregate consumption of the
 young cohort and the aggregate consumption
 of the old cohort, I now examine the in-
 tracohort distributions of consumption and
 wealth. As already shown (equation (20)),
 the first-period consumption of type-0 con-
 sumers increases by apR-1S in response to
 the introduction of Social Security. Also I
 have shown that W(?) falls by T+apR-'S
 when Social Security is introduced. As a
 consequence of the fall in WO), there is a
 reduction in bequests, B('), received at birth
 by type-I consumers. Indeed, the introduc-
 tion of Social Security reduces BO') for all
 type-j consumers for j=1,2,3,.... This re-
 sult follows from the facts that BO1) is pro-
 portional to W(?) (see equations (13) and
 (14)) and that W(?) is reduced by the intro-
 duction of Social Security. Below I analyze
 the effects of the induced reduction in be-
 quests in the intracohort distribution of con-
 sumption.
 The deviation of a typej consumer's first-
 period consumption from the average level
 of first-period consumption is proportional
 to B(j) - B* (see equations (11) and (23)):
 (26) cO) -Cl = a ( B() - B*).
 Since BO') and B* are each proportional to
 W(?), it follows that c(j)-C * is also propor-
 tional to W(0).17 Because the introduction of
 actuarially fair Social Security reduces W",
 it also reduces the (magnitude of the) de-
 viation of type-j consumer's first-period
 consumption from the average first-period
 consumption.'8 Thus, the distribution of
 consumption is narrowed by the introduction
 of Social Security. More precisely, all central
 moments of the intracohort distribution of
 CO) are reduced by the introduction of Social
 Security.
 The effects of the introduction of Social
 Security on second-period consumption are
 easily calculated by observing from (8) that
 c(j) can be expressed as an increasing linear
 function of c( ). Therefore, the narrowing of
 the distribution of c(j) implies that the dis-
 tribution of c(') is also narrowed by the
 introduction of Social Security.
 For the case in which R = G, it is
 straightforward to analyze the (steady-state)
 welfare implications of the introduction of
 Social Security. In this case, the introduction
 of actuarially fair Social Security does not
 affect the average levels of consumption of
 the young or of the old as explained in
 Section III, Part A. However, it narrows the
 distribution of consumption of each cohort.
 Therefore, if each consumer has an identical
 utility function and receives equal weight in
 the social welfare function, the introduction
 of Social Security is welfare improving. If
 R < G, then the introduction of Social Secur-
 ity raises the average level of consumption
 and reduces the variance of consumption.
 Each of these effects increases social welfare.
 However, if R > G, then the introduction of
 Social Security reduces average consump-
 tion, which tends to reduce welfare, but also
 reduces the intracohort variance of consump-
 tion, which tends to raise welfare.
 IV. The Transition Path to the New
 Steady State
 The analysis in Section III of the effects of
 the introduction of actuarially fair Social
 Security was a comparative steady-state anal-
 15, W(o) is reduced by the introduction of pay-as-you-go
 Social Security. Therefore, since W* is proportional to
 W(?), it follows that W* is also reduced. As in the text,
 aggregate consumption is reduced, increased, or left un-
 changed according to whether R is greater than, less
 than, or equal to G.
 17More formally, using equations (13), (14), (16), and
 (17), equation (26) can be rewritten as
 C'j)-C = la ( R/G) W(O)
 x( (1-a)(R/) 1 - p (R /G)(1 - a))
 where -j- '(I - a)'(R/G)' is equal to zero for j = 0.
 "8Recall from fn. 15 that W(0) is also reduced by
 pay-as-you-go Social Security. Hence, pay-as-you-go So-
 cial Security also narrows the distribution of consump-
 tion.
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 ysis; it was assumed that the Social Security
 system had been in effect long enough
 so that essentially no one received a be-
 quest that included part of the savings of an
 ancestor who lived in the initial regime
 without Social Security. Equivalently, it was
 assumed that each person had at least one
 ancestor who lived for two periods under the
 new regime, leaving no bequests and thus
 severing links to the old regime.
 In this section, I examine the transition
 path to the new steady state, which accompa-
 nies the introduction of an actuarially fair
 Social Security system. I show that the intro-
 duction of Social Security reduces the in-
 tracohort variances of first-period and sec-
 ond-period consumption for every genera-
 tion (except the first) born under the new
 Social Security regime. Also, if R < G, then
 the average levels of first-period and second-
 period consumption of each generation are
 at least as high under the Social Security
 regime as in the absence of Social Security.
 In this case, the introduction of Social Secur-
 ity increases the welfare of every generation
 born under the Social Security regime.
 Suppose that actuarially fair fully funded
 Social Security is introduced at the beginning
 of period t* + 1. It will be assumed that since
 the older cohort (born at time t*) did
 not contribute to the Social Security system,
 they receive no benefits. The young genera-
 tion (born at time t* + 1) pays a tax T=
 (1 - p )R - 1S and the survivors will each re-
 ceive a Social Security payment of S as dis-
 cussed in Section III. The bequests received
 by each individual in the young generation
 are invariant to the introduction of Social
 Security, and for a given level of bequests
 received at birth, the introduction of Social
 Security increases the present value of life-
 time income by pR - 1S. Thus, every con-
 sumer in this generation increases first-period
 consumption by apR-'S, and every surviv-
 or increases second-period consumption by
 (1 -a )pS. This generation unanimously fa-
 vors the introduction of actuarially fair So-
 cial Security.
 Next I consider the effect of the introduc-
 tion of Social Security on subsequent genera-
 tions. Let the subscript m denote that a
 variable pertains to a consumer born at the
 beginning of period t* + m. Let A denote the
 change in a variable induced by the intro-
 duction of Social Security (relative to the
 regime without Social Security). Thus, the
 effect of Social Security on the first-period
 consumption of type-j consumers born at
 time t* + m is obtained from (11) and (13) as
 (27) AC (j) = Ac-() + a ( R /<G ) AW(i -l
 j=1,2,3,...
 m = 2,3,4,....
 Equation (27) displays the two countervail-
 ing effects on the consumption of subsequent
 generations. It follows immediately from (20)
 that
 (28) AcM =apR-1S>O.
 Thus, as explained earlier, the first-period
 consumption of type-0 consumers increases.
 For consumers who receive positive be-
 quests at birth, there is a second effect on
 consumption and lifetime income because
 these consumers receive smaller bequests as a
 result of the introduction of Social Security.
 A straightforward generalization of (14)
 yields
 J*~
 (29) AW(j=l)=AW(?) E, (1-a)'(R/G)'
 i=0
 j =1,2,3,...
 m 2,3,4,....
 where j* = min(j, m -1). Observe from (21)
 that19
 (30) AW(0) (T+ apR-1S) < 0.
 Since AW(?) < 0, it is clear from (29) that
 A WA({ 7) < 0 so that type-j consumers born
 at the beginning of period t* + m receive
 smaller bequests at birth. The magnitude of
 the reduction in bequests is strictly increas-
 ing in j*. Thus, for the generation born at
 19Recall from fn. 15 that A W(t0 < 0 for pay-as-you-go
 Social Security also.
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 the beginning of period t* + m, the reduction
 in bequests received by type-j consumers is
 strictly increasing in j for j = 0,1 ..., m - 1,
 and is constant for j=m-1,m,m+1,....
 This finding combined with the fact that the
 level of bequests received by type-j con-
 sumers is strictly increasing in j for the
 Social Security regime as well as the regime
 without Social Security implies that the
 introduction of Social Security reduces the
 intracohort variance of bequests received by
 all generations born after period t* + 1.20
 Since first-period (second-period) consump-
 tion is a linear function of the bequest
 received at birth, the introduction of Social
 Security also reduces the intracohort vari-
 ance of first-period (second-period) con-
 sumption for these generations.
 I have derived unambiguous results about
 the intracohort variance of consumption
 along the transition path to the new steady
 state. The effects on the average level of
 consumption are less clear-cut. As already
 shown, for the generation born at the begin-
 ning of period t* + 1, the average levels of
 first-period and second-period consumption
 are increased by the introduction of Social
 Security. It has also been shown that, in the
 new steady state, the average levels of c(j)
 and c decrease, increase, or remain un-
 changed, depending on whether R is greater
 than, less than, or equal to G. I show in the
 Appendix that ?AC*m, the change in the
 average level of first-period consumption of
 the generation born at time t* + m, is
 (31) C*m = -1 apR -1 x 1-p(R/G)(1- a)
 x {1 -(R/G)+?[1- p( - a)I
 x (RIG)mp m-1(I _-a)m-11.
 Since it has been assumed that (1- a)pR is
 less than G, it is clear from (31) that AC1*m
 decreases as m increases. The reason is that
 as m increases (i.e., as we increase the length
 of time for which the Social Security regime
 has been in effect), there is a decrease in the
 amount of bequests which represent accu-
 mulated saving from generations born before
 the introduction of Social Security, when
 private saving was higher.
 In the case in which R = G, equation (31)
 implies that AC*m is equal to aR - lSpm
 (1 - a)"1, which is positive for all finite m.
 Thus, since the introduction of Social Secur-
 ity increases the average and reduces the
 variance of c(') for all finite m, it also (see
 equation (8)) increases the average value and
 reduces the variance of c() for all finite m.
 Therefore, if R = G, the introduction of So-
 cial Security is welfare improving for every
 generation born under the new Social Secur-
 ity regime. More generally, if R < G, the
 welfare of every generation (except the cur-
 rent old generation which is unaffected) is
 improved by the introduction of Social
 Security.
 The welfare effects of the introduction of
 Social Security are less clear-cut in the case
 in which R > G. Clearly, the welfare of the
 generation born at time t* +1 is improved
 because, as explained earlier, the first-period
 consumption of every consumer in this gen-
 eration increases by apR - 1S (and from equa-
 tion (8), second-period consumption in-
 creases by (1 - a)pS). For all generations
 born after time t* +1, the introduction of
 Social Security reduces the intracohort vari-
 ance of consumption. For sufficiently small
 m, it follows from (31) that the average level
 of first-period (and second-period) consump-
 tion is increased by the introduction of So-
 cial Security. Thus, for these generations,
 welfare is increased. The difficulty in my
 welfare analysis arises for generations born
 long after the introduction of Social Security.
 If R > G, then it follows from (31) that for
 sufficiently large m, the average first-period
 (and a fortiori average second-period) con-
 sumption of the generation born at time
 t * + m is reduced by the introduction of
 Social Security. The effect on the welfare of
 this generation thus depends on whether the
 welfare-improving effects of reduced vari-
 ance dominate the welfare-worsening effects
 of reduced average consumption.
 2()This statement is simply an application of the fact
 that if x( j) and y(j) are strictly increasing in j, and if
 y( j) - x(j) is nonincreasing in j and strictly decreasing
 for some j, then the variance y(j) is less than the
 variance of x(j).
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 V. Private Annuities
 In previous sections in this paper, it was
 assumed that there is no private market for
 annuities, and I showed that the introduction
 of actuarially fair Social Security reduces the
 national capital stock. However, if there were
 a competitive market for annuities, then the
 introduction of Social Security would have
 no effect because the competitively supplied
 actuarially fair annuities would be perfect
 substitutes for actuarially fair Social Secur-
 ity; hence, consumers could completely offset
 the effects of Social Security by conducting
 transactions in the private annuity market.
 Since the introduction of actuarially fair So-
 cial Security reduces the steady-state capital
 stock, it is natural to ask whether the intro-
 duction of a competitive annuity market also
 reduces the steady-state capital stock. In this
 section, we analyze a simple example to show
 that the introduction of a market for private
 annuities can either increase or decrease the
 steady-state capital stock.2'
 With the introduction of private annuities,
 there are now two alternative forms in which
 a consumer can hold his wealth. As before,
 he can hold capital directly, earning a gross
 rate of return R. Alternatively, he can de-
 posit his savings at an annuity company. The
 annuity company operates by accepting de-
 posits from young consumers and using these
 deposits to buy capital which earns a gross
 rate of return R. At the beginning of the
 following period, the annuity company dis-
 tributes its holdings (with accumulated inter-
 est) to its surviving depositors in proportion
 to their initial deposits. Thus, each surviving
 depositor at the annuity company receives
 A = R /(1 - p) dollars for each dollar ini-
 tially deposited. As shown by Yaari, con-
 sumers who do not have explicit bequest
 motives will choose to hold all of their wealth
 in the form of these annuities. Thus, there
 will be no bequests.
 Consumers can, by holding annuities, earn
 a gross rate of return A on their savings so
 that c2 = A[Y - cl]. The maximization prob-
 lem of the representative consumer22 is
 (32) Max U(cl)+ (l-p) SU(A(Y- cl)).
 Ci
 The first-order condition for this problem is
 (33) U'(cl) = (1- p)A 3U'(C2)-
 With actuarially fair annuities (1- p)A = R,
 so that the first-order condition (33) can be
 written as
 (34) U'(cl ) = R 8U (C2
 where a circumflex denotes the value of a
 variable in the presence of a private annuity
 market.
 For the remainder of this section we as-
 sume that R = 8 = 1, that is, that the net rate
 of return on capital and the rate of time
 preference are each equal to zero. With RS
 = 1, (34) implies that c = c for any strictly
 concave utility function U( ). Since C2 =
 A(Y- c) and A = (1- p), we obtain cl =
 c2= (1/(2- p))Y. Therefore, since W= Y-
 cl, we obtain
 (35) 'W = ((I - p )/(2 - p )) Y.
 Now consider the economy without an
 annuity market. For the remainder of this
 section, it will be assumed that U(c) exhibits
 constant relative risk aversion. Recall from
 Section I that with R = 8 = 1, and a constant
 coefficient of relative risk aversion equal to
 a, the marginal (and average) propensity
 to consume is a=[1+(1_p)1/1]l1. Thus,
 the first-period consumption of type-O con-
 sumers is
 (3) 10 Y/(' + (I1-p )
 It is straightforward to show that
 (37) c > c(?) as a> 1.
 21See Kotlikoff, John Shoven, and Spivak (1983) for
 an analysis of the effects of various annuity arrange-
 ments on capital accumulation.
 22 Since there are no bequests, there is no need to
 distinguish consumers according to the mortality history
 of their families. Also, since actuarially fair Social Secur-
 ity has no effect in the presence of an annuity market, I
 simply set S= T= 0.
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 The intuition for this result is that the intro-
 duction of a private annuity market raises
 the rate of return on private savings from R
 to R /(1 - p). The income effect of this
 change is to raise first-period consumption
 whereas the substitution effect is to reduce
 first-period consumption. With a > 1, the in-
 come effect dominates and with a <1, the
 substitution effect dominates. For logarith-
 mic utility, (a =1), the income and substitu-
 tion effects exactly offset each other. By con-
 trast, notice that although Social Security has
 the payoff characteristics of an annuity, the
 introduction of actuarially fair Social Secur-
 ity has a positive income effect but has no
 substitution effect because individual con-
 sumers cannot choose the level of savings to
 be held in the form of Social Security.
 The analysis in the above paragraph ex-
 amines the effect on type-0 consumers of the
 introduction of an annuity market. For type-j
 consumers, there is an additional effect, be-
 cause these consumers receive bequests in the
 absence of private annuities but do not re-
 ceive bequests in the presence of annuities.
 To calculate the effect of an annuity market
 on the long-run capital stock, observe from
 (10) and (17) that in the absence of annu-
 ities, and with R = 8 = 1, the steady-state
 capital stock is
 (38) W* =Y[+1p -pIG]
 Comparing (35) and (38) it can be shown
 that
 (39) W> W* as a >a
 where
 a=[_ln(l+((I p)p /G))]<1 U ~~~ln(I1-p) <1
 According to (39), there is a critical value
 of the coefficient of relative risk aversion that
 determines whether the long-run capital stock
 increases or decreases when a private annuity
 market is introduced. When a > 1, the intro-
 duction of an annuity market raises first-
 period consumption of type-0 consumers and
 thus reduces their saving. In addition, the
 elimination of bequests received by type-j
 consumers for j11 also tends to reduce
 private wealth.23 On the other hand, when
 a <1, the introduction of private annuities
 reduce the first-period consumption and in-
 creases the saving of type-0 consumers.
 Whether this wealth-increasing effect dom-
 inates the wealth-reducing effect of elim-
 inating bequests depends on whether a is
 less than a.
 VI. Concluding Remarks
 I have developed a general equilibrium
 model of precautionary saving and acciden-
 tal bequests that is sufficiently rich to pro-
 duce endogenous distributions of consump-
 tion, wealth, and bequests. The model is
 based on individual utility-maximizing be-
 havior and yields decision rules for con-
 sumers that are linear and easily aggregated.
 After developing the model in Sections I and
 II, it was shown in Section III that, in the
 absence of a private annuity market, the
 introduction of actuarially fair Social Secur-
 ity crowds out private wealth by more than
 one for one, thereby reducing national
 wealth; in addition, it reduces all central
 moments of the distributions of consump-
 tion, wealth, and bequests. Section IV
 analyzes the transition path to the new steady
 state when Social Security is introduced. The
 immediate effect is for the average level of
 consumption by young consumers to in-
 crease and for the variance of their consump-
 tion to remain unchanged. However, both
 the mean and the variance of consumption
 by young consumers decreases continually as
 23 Kotlikoff, Shoven, and Spivak examine a more
 complex overlapping-generations model with uncertain
 lifetimes. They solve their model numerically, and in
 each of their numerical simulations, they assume that
 the constant coefficient of relative risk aversion is greater
 than one. Although they find that the introduction of a
 perfect annuity market reduces long-run aggregate
 wealth in each of their similations, the results in (39)
 suggest caution in applying this result to consumers with
 a coefficient of relative risk aversion sufficiently below
 one. Of course, since their model differs somewhat from
 the model presented herein, the critical value of the
 coefficient of relative risk aversion, if one exists, would
 probably differ from that in (39).
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 each subsequent generation is born. In Sec-
 tion V, I switched attention from publicly
 provided annuities to privately traded annu-
 ities and showed that the introduction of a
 private annuity market would cause the
 steady-state capital stock to increase or de-
 crease depending on the risk aversion of
 consumers.
 The model presented in this paper was
 purposely designed to allow a simple ex-
 amination of precautionary saving and acci-
 dental bequests in a general equilibrium
 framework. Toward this end, the following
 simplifying assumptions were made: 1) con-
 sumers live for either one or two periods; 2)
 the rate of return on capital, R, is constant;
 3) there is no private market for annuities
 (except in Section V); and 4) consumers are
 selfish, that is, they have no bequest motive.
 An implication of assumption 1 and the
 assumption that consumers give birth to their
 children at the end of the first period of life
 is that each consumer knows at birth exactly
 what bequest he will receive from his parent.
 If consumers lived potentially for many peri-
 ods so that a parent's lifetime uncertainty
 were not resolved when the child is born,
 then we would have the additional problem
 of calculating optimal consumption behavior
 when there is the prospect of receiving a
 bequest of uncertain size at an unknown date
 in the future. Edi Karni and Itzhak Zilcha
 (1984) have examined the case in which con-
 sumers live for three periods. They prove the
 existence of the steady-state equilibrium in
 the absence of annuity and insurance mar-
 kets, and demonstrate that the introduction
 of competitive life insurance and annuity
 markets leads to a Pareto optimal steady-state
 equilibrium. However, they do not provide
 closed-form solutions for consumption. Also,
 their model cannot be used to examine long-
 run capital accumulation since capital is ab-
 sent from their model. Kotlikoff, Shoven,
 and Spivak also relax assumption 1, but pro-
 vide numerical rather analytic solutions of
 their model.
 Assumptions 1 and 2 are both relaxed by
 Glenn Hubbard (1984). In place of the linear
 technology assumed above, Hubbard intro-
 duces a neoclassical production function into
 a model with uncertain lifetimes. However,
 he assumes that the government confiscates
 the assets held by consumers when they die
 and then redistributes the assets in lump sum
 fashion. This assumption circumvents the
 technical difficulty mentioned above but this
 simplification also eliminates the intracohort
 variations in consumption and wealth. Hub-
 bard does not solve his model analytically
 and resorts to numerical simulation to study
 the effects of Social Security.
 Assumption 3 is crucial in order for Social
 Security to have an effect in this model. If
 there were a competitive annuity market, the
 rate of return on competitively supplied an-
 nuities would be equal to the implicit rate of
 return offered by Social Security. In this case
 consumers could undo the effects of Social
 Security by conducting offsetting transac-
 tions in the private annuity market. How-
 ever, if the probability of dying after one
 period of life differed across consumers, then
 Social Security would have an effect on be-
 havior. In another paper (1984a), I assume
 that an individual's probability of an early
 death is private information known only by
 the individual, so that the private annuity
 market is subject to adverse selection. How-
 ever, a compulsory Social Security system is
 immune to adverse selection and can offer a
 higher rate of return than the equilibrium
 rate of return in the private annuity market.
 Thus, consumers cannot effectively undo the
 effects of Social Security by transacting in
 the private annuity market because private
 and social annuities are no longer perfect
 substitutes.
 Eckstein, Eichenbaum, and Peled (1985b)
 also use the insight that the Social Security
 system is immune to adverse selection. They
 assume that consumers have no bequest mo-
 tive so that with a private annuity market,
 there are no bequests, accidental or other-
 wise. However, in my 1984a paper, I relax
 assumption 4 and specify the utility function
 to have a bequest motive. I then show that
 the introduction of Social Security can either
 increase or decrease the steady-state capital
 stock depending on the strength of the be-
 quest motive. In my 1984b paper, I assume
 that the probability of an early death differs
 across consumers, but these probabilities are
 public information. In this case, the intro-
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 duction of actuarially fair Social Security will
 have an effect if the government chooses not
 to discriminate on the basis of the probabil-
 ity of dying.
 Although I have made some progress in
 incorporating a bequest motive into an over-
 lapping generations model with uncertain
 lifetimes, further research is needed. My oth-
 er papers (1984a, b) used the Hakansson,
 Fischer, and Scott Richard (1975) utility
 function which specifies a consumer's utility
 as a function of his own consumption and of
 the size of the bequest he leaves. An alterna-
 tive formulation is based on Barro's inter-
 generational altruism in which a consumer
 derives utility from his own consumption
 and from the utility of his heirs. This formu-
 lation effectively converts the individual con-
 sumer' s decision problem into an infinite
 horizon problem. In future research I plan to
 study the role for fiscal policy in an overlap-
 ping generations economy populated by con-
 sumers with uncertain lifetimes and altruistic
 bequest motives.
 APPENDIX
 Here I derive equation (31) in the text
 which shows the effect on Ci*m of the intro-
 duction in period t* +1 of actuarially fair
 Social Security.
 It will be useful to define x as
 (Al) x-(1-a)(R/G).
 Under actuarially fair Social Security, RT=
 (1-p)S so that
 (A2) (R/G)(T?apR-1S)
 - (R/G)(1-p + ap)R -S
 = ((R/G)-px)R-1S.
 Substituting (28)-(30) into (27) and using
 (Al) and (A2), we obtain
 (A3) AC(J)
 { ~~~~j*-l
 =aR-'S P-[(R/G)-pxI E xj
 i = 0
 As a step toward calculating the average
 value of each side of (A3), I first calculate
 00 j*-l
 (A4) (I (-P)pj E xi
 j j i=O
 Recalling that j* = min(j, m - 1), (A4) can
 be rearranged to yield
 00 j*-1
 (A5) E (1-p P)pj E xi
 j=O i=O
 I [ m-1 00 = - 1 j1- pjxi j- E p jxm-
 Calculating the sums on the right-hand side
 of (A5) yields
 00 j*-1
 (A6) F (1- p)pj E xi
 j=O i=O
 1-p I1-pi xm-i 1-PMXM 1 = _ _____1px
 l-x l-p l-x which can be simplified to yield
 00 j*-l
 (A7) E (1-p) pi E xi
 j = 0 i=O
 = ( p/(l - px))l p- P-xM-1).
 Now calculate the average value of each side
 of (A3) and use (A7) to obtain
 (A8) L\CI*m=apR-S - (R/G) -px
 X (1- pm-iXm )}
 Rearranging (A8) yields
 (A9) ACm = apR1-P {1-(R/G)
 + [(R/G)- px] pm-lxm-l}
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 Recognizing that
 (AIO) [(RIG)-px]pn p- Ixm-1
 = [1-p(l-a)]Ipm (I-a)m " (R/G)
 then yields equation (31) in the text.
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